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PUBLIC POLICY APPROACHES TOWARDS 
THE UNDECLARED ECONOMY IN EUROPEAN 
COUNTRIES: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW
Colin C. Williams*
Abstract
h e aim of this paper is to evaluate critically the extent to which the conventional 
eradication approach towards undeclared work has been transcended and replaced by 
an approach which seeks to shit  undeclared work into the declared economy. Reporting 
the results of a 2010 survey of 104 senior stakeholders from government departments, 
trade unions and employer organisations in 31 European countries, and 24 follow-up 
in-depth interviews, the i nding is that although there is a move towards adopting policy 
measures that shit  undeclared work into the declared economy, a deterrence approach 
that simply seeks to eliminate undeclared work remains the principal approach in 
most nations and the approach viewed as the most ef ective way of tackling undeclared 
work. Given this intransigence on the part of European national governments, the 
paper concludes by setting out a future research agenda to bridge this gap.
Keywords: European Union; informal sector; labour law; public policy; shadow economy
1. INTRODUCTION
Following the 2003 Lisbon Summit of the European Council, when tackling undeclared 
work was named as one of the top ten priorities for action with regard to employment 
reform (European Commission, 2003a, 2003b and 2003c), the European Commission 
recognised that the conventional approach that sought to deter engagement in undeclared 
work needed to be transcended. Instead, a new approach was advocated that seeks to move 
undeclared work into the declared realm (European Commission, 2007a). h is paper 
evaluates the degree to which this has been adopted by European national governments.
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To achieve this, the i rst section commences by providing a brief review of 
the extent and nature of the undeclared economy in the 27 Member States of the 
European Union (EU-27), followed in the second section by an analysis of the various 
possible policy approaches available for tackling undeclared work. Revealing that 
the European Commission has recently called for a new approach that seeks to shit  
undeclared work into the declared economy rather than simply eliminate it using 
deterrence measures, the third section then evaluates the degree to which European 
national governments have adopted this policy approach. Reporting a 2010 survey of 
104 senior stakeholders from government departments, trade unions and employer 
organisations in 31  European countries, and 24 follow-up in-depth interviews, 
the i nding is that although national governments are adopting an array of policy 
measures to shit  undeclared work into the declared economy, deterring undeclared 
work remains the principal approach in most nations. h e fourth and i nal section 
then draws some conclusions and sets out a future research agenda for improving 
understanding of how undeclared work can be shit ed into the declared economy.
Before commencing, however, undeclared work needs to be dei ned. Ever since 
Hart (1973) i rst introduced the concept of the ‘informal sector’ in his study of 
Ghana 40 years ago, how to dei ne this undeclared economy and distinguish it from 
the declared economy has been an on-going debate. Reviewing the vast subsequent 
literature on dei ning this sphere, it becomes quickly apparent that all of this literature 
has sought to dei ne undeclared work in terms of what is absent from or insui  cient 
about it relative to the declared economy (Williams and Lansky, 2013). h is is similarly 
the case with the working dei nition adopted by the European Commission (2007a: 
2), which dei nes the undeclared economy as ‘any paid activities that are lawful as 
regards their nature but not declared to the public authorities, taking into account the 
dif erences in the regulatory system of Member States’. What is deemed missing or 
absent from undeclared work, therefore, is that these paid activities are not declared 
to the public authorities for either tax, social security and/or labour law purposes 
(European Commission 2007a, 2014; OECD 2002, 2012; Williams and Renooy 2013). 
If paid activities possess additional absences or insui  ciencies, they are not dei ned as 
undeclared work. For instance, if paid activities involve illegal goods and/or services, 
such as in the case of drug trai  cking, they are deemed ‘criminal’ activities, and if 
unpaid, they are deemed part of the ‘unpaid’ economy rather than the undeclared 
economy. With this dei nition of the undeclared economy in hand, attention now turns 
to a brief review of the extent and nature of the undeclared economy in the EU-27.
2. EXTENT AND NATURE OF THE UNDECLARED 
ECONOMY
Measuring the undeclared economy is dii  cult because this paid activity is by dei nition 
hidden from the public authorities for tax, social security and/or labour law purposes. 
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For this reason, indirect measurement methods have been employed which use proxy 
indicators and/or seek statistical traces of such work found in data collected for other 
purposes. h ese range from methods using monetary indicators as proxies, such as the 
currency demand method which takes the use of cash as an indicator of undeclared 
work, through those using non-monetary indicators, such as discrepancies in the 
labour supply i gures across dif erent surveys, and those using discrepancies between 
income and expenditure either at the aggregate or household level, to measurement 
methods using multiple indirect indicators (GHK and Fondazione Brodolini 2009; Ram 
and Williams 2008). However, other scholars have claimed that even if participants 
hide this work from the authorities, they do not hide it from researchers and openly 
discuss such activity with them (MacDonald 1994; Pahl 1984; Williams 2001). As 
such, undeclared work has been directly investigated using qualitative, quantitative 
or mixed method surveys (Leonard 1994; Neef 2002; Pahl 1984; Round et al. 2008; 
Williams 2001; Williams and Round, 2007a,b, 2008, 2009; Williams and Windebank 
1994). h ese direct surveys, however, have tended to produce lower estimates of its 
size than indirect methods, causing proponents of indirect measurement methods 
to argue that participants do indeed conceal their undeclared work from researchers 
(Schneider 2005). Although there is no way of knowing whether direct surveys produce 
underestimates or indirect methods inl ated estimates of its size, the consensus that has 
emerged across the practitioner and academic communities has been to use indirect 
measurement methods to measure its size and direct survey methods to evaluate its 
nature (European Commission 1998, 2007b; OECD 2012; h omas 1988; Ram and 
Williams 2008; Schneider 2008; Williams 2009a,b).
Here, this consensus is followed by using an indirect measurement method to 
evaluate cross-national variations in its size in the EU-27 and a direct survey method 
to evaluate its varying nature across the EU-27. To do this, the most widely cited 
indirect measurement method is selected, namely the DYMIMIC (dynamic multiple-
indicators multiple-causes) method, to evaluate its variable size (for a detailed 
description of how this method calculates the size of the undeclared economy, see 
Schneider 2005). Rather than rely on one indicator to measure its size, the advantage 
of this method is that multiple monetary and non-monetary indicators, related to the 
money in circulation, level of tax morality and labour supply, are used. Although the 
detailed methodology used to estimate its magnitude is not necessarily as clear as 
many scholars would desire, the distinct advantage of using this method here is that 
data is readily available for the EU-27 (see Schneider et al. 2013).
h e direct survey used to evaluate the nature of the undeclared economy, meanwhile, 
is the extensive cross-national survey on the character of undeclared work conducted 
in 2007 as part of wave 67.3 of Eurobarometer (European Commission 2007b; TNS 
Infratest et al. 2006). Indeed, this is the only EU-wide cross-national dataset currently 
available on the character of the undeclared economy (the 2013  Eurobarometer 
is not available at the time of writing). Replicating the sampling method of other 
Eurobarometer surveys, 26,659 face-to-face interviews were conducted in the EU-27, 
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ranging from some 500 interviews in smaller nations to more than 1,500 interviews 
in larger EU countries conducted in a manner that provides a representative sample 
of the population in each country (European Commission 2007b).
2.1. SIZE OF THE UNDECLARED ECONOMY
Figure 1 displays the magnitude of the undeclared economy in the EU-27. h is reveals 
that in 2012 the unweighted average size of the undeclared economy in the EU-27 
was 18.4 per cent of GDP. Such work, therefore, is not some small residual sphere. It 
is a prominent feature of the contemporary European economic landscape. However, 
there are marked variations in its size across Member States, ranging from 7.6 per 
cent in Austria to 31.9 per cent in Bulgaria. Indeed, a clear geographical divide exists 
with regard to the variations in the size of the undeclared economy across the EU. 
In Northern and Western European Member States, the undeclared economy is on 
average smaller than in East-Central and Southern European Member States.
Figure 1. Size of undeclared economy as % of GDP, 2012: by country
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Turning to whether the undeclared economy is growing or declining in the current 
period of economic crisis, two contrasting perspectives exist. One perspective argues 
that the undeclared economy is growing. h e rationale is that: i rms and households 
will seek to save on costs in the face of falling proi t and income by substituting 
declared work with undeclared work, and unemployed workers will be more willing 
to engage in undeclared work as a coping practice. h e alternative viewpoint is that 
the undeclared economy is declining because of: the lower demand for undeclared 
labour due to less money being available; traditional sectors where undeclared work 
is concentrated (e.g., construction, hotels and restaurants) being harder hit in times 
of economic crisis, and undeclared work being substituted by ‘l exible’ and cheaper 
declared labour, leading to greater in-work poverty (Williams and Renooy 2013).
As Figure 2 displays, the evidence appears to support the latter perspective. 
Although a slight rise occurred in the size of the undeclared economy between 2008 
and 2009, there has been an on-going decline in the size of the undeclared economy 
in the European Union as a whole between 2003 and 2012. Indeed, Schneider (2013) 
shows that this is the trend across each and every EU Member State. Over the past 
decade and particularly during the current period of economic crisis, therefore, the 
undeclared economy has been declining, displaying how it is not a substitute for the 
declared economy that grows when the declared economy declines, but rather, that it 
rises and falls in tandem with the declared economy.
Figure 2. Size of undeclared economy in EU-27 as % of GDP, 2003-2012
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2.2. NATURE OF THE UNDECLARED ECONOMY
For many decades, the dominant depiction of undeclared work was that it was low-
paid waged employment conducted under degrading ‘sweatshop-like’ conditions for 
unscrupulous employers (Castells and Portes 1989; Davis 2006; Sassen 1996). h is led 
Public Policy Approaches Towards the Undeclared Economy in European Countries
European Labour Law Journal, Volume 5 (2014), No. 2 137
governments to view this undeclared sphere as something to be stamped out. However, 
the i ndings of small-scale studies conducted in localities and nations throughout the 
EU-27 have challenged this dominant depiction (Leonard 1994; Neef 2002; Pahl 1984; 
Round et al. 2008; Williams 2001; Williams and Round 2007a,b, 2008, 2009; Williams 
and Windebank 1994; Williams et al. 2013).
Firstly, a range of additional types of undeclared waged employment have been 
identii ed. h ere has been growing recognition of a continuum of undeclared wage 
levels, just as there is a continuum of declared wage levels, and although the mean 
undeclared wage is lower than the mean declared wage, these two spectrums overlap 
meaning that some undeclared waged work is higher paid than declared waged work 
(Jütting and Laiglesia 2009; Krstić and Sanfey 2011). Not only has well-paid undeclared 
waged work been recognised, but it has been also found that besides wholly undeclared 
jobs hidden from the state for tax, social security and labour law purposes, there are 
also ‘under-declared’ formal jobs where declared employees receive two wages from 
their declared employer, one declared and one undeclared ‘envelope wage’ (Meriküll 
and Staehr 2010; Neef 2002; Žabko and Rajevska 2007; Williams 2007; Williams and 
Round 2007; Woolfson 2007). Such envelope wages can be paid by formal employers 
either for overtime and/or for the regular work conducted by their declared employees 
(Williams 2009a,b).
Secondly, it has been revealed that undeclared work is ot en conducted on an own-
account or self-employed basis (Neef 2002; Round et al. 2008; Smith and Stenning 
2006; Williams 2005; Williams and Round 2007). h is ranges from ‘false self-
employment’, where a person works for one employer but is self-employed and pays 
no wage tax, has no rights such as dismissal protection and no vacation entitlements, 
through to various forms of proper self-employment conducted either by the declared 
self-employed conducting various portions of their trade undeclared or by the self-
employed working on a wholly undeclared basis. Indeed, this has subsequently led to 
the undeclared economy being viewed more positively as a ‘hidden enterprise culture’ 
and breeding ground for new business ventures (Bureau and Fendt 2011; Williams 
2007, 2008b; Williams and Nadin 2013; Williams and Round 2007a). At er all, people 
do not have an idea for a business venture and then create a wholly legitimate enterprise 
the next day; they instead ot en test-trade the business idea to test its viability before 
deciding whether to create a legitimate enterprise. Indeed, evidence has begun 
to emerge not only that a signii cant proportion of nascent entrepreneurs start-up 
trading in the undeclared economy (Williams and Martinez 2014) but also that 
many established entrepreneurs trade partially or fully in the undeclared economy 
(Williams and Nadin 2013). h e response has been a burgeoning new sub-i eld of 
entrepreneurship termed ‘informal sector entrepreneurship’ (Adom and Williams 
2012; Aidis et al. 2006; Antonopoulos and Mitra 2009; Copisarow and Barbour 2004; 
Dana 2013; Dellot 2012; Gurtoo and Williams 2010; Hudson et al. 2012; Katungi et 
al. 2004; Ram et al. 2007; Small Business Council 2004; Webb et al. 2009).
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h irdly, it has also been recognised that much of this own-account undeclared 
work is undertaken for closer social relations such as kin, neighbours, friends and 
acquaintances, for the purposes of redistribution and helping out (Morris 2011; 
Onoschenko and Williams 2013; Persson and Malmer 2006; White and Williams 
2010). For example, a person may pay their cousin 200  euros for decorating their 
living room to give him some money when he is unemployed. h is is done because 
it is known that they will not accept charity but will accept the money for doing the 
decorating. In practice, of course, undeclared self-employment and paid favours 
overlap since own-account work is composed of many varieties along a spectrum 
from purely market-like proi t-motivated undeclared self-employment, through 
forms of social entrepreneurship where ‘mate’s rates’ (i.e., friends’ rates) are charged 
for a job (Williams et al. 2013), to purely solidarity-oriented familial and community-
based paid favours. As a general rule, the i nding has been that the closer are the social 
relations, the less market-like are the transactions (White 2009; White and Williams 
2010).
In recent years, the prevalence of these dif erent forms of undeclared work across 
the EU-27 has started to be understood. In 2007, an extensive Eurobarometer survey 
of undeclared work involving 26,659 face-to-face interviews in 27 European countries 
was conducted (TNS Infratest et al.  2007; Williams and Renooy 2013). h is i nds 
that just under one in ten (9 per cent) of the surveyed population participated in 
either undeclared or under-declared (‘envelope wage’) work in the 12 months prior 
to interview, of which 4 per cent engaged solely in undeclared work, a further 4 per 
cent solely in under-declared ‘envelope wage’ work and 1 per cent in both undeclared 
and under-declared work. However, marked geographical variations are identii ed 
in the propensity to engage in the undeclared economy. Whilst in East-Central 
Europe nearly one in i ve (18 per cent) of the surveyed population had participated 
in undeclared or under-declared work in the previous 12 months and 12 per cent in 
Nordic nations, this i gure was just 8 per cent in Southern Europe and 5 per cent in 
Western Europe (Williams and Renooy 2013).
Examining the nature of the wholly undeclared work across the EU-27, just 22 
per cent was waged employment and 78 per cent conducted on a self-employed basis; 
with 57 per cent being carried out on an own-account basis for closer social relations 
and 21 per cent on a self-employed basis for other private individuals, households 
and businesses. Analysing under-declared work, meanwhile, 1 in 20 (5 per cent) of 
all declared employees received envelope wages from their formal employer in the 
previous year amounting on average to over two-i t hs (43 per cent) of their gross 
total wage. Of these, 29 per cent received such payments for their regular work, 27 per 
cent for extra work or overtime and 36 per cent for both their regular and overtime 
work (Williams and Renooy 2013). Extrapolating to the EU as a whole, this intimates 
that some 11 million of the 210 million employees in the EU might be in receipt 
of envelope wages: some 3 million for their regular work (mostly in East-Central 
European nations), 3 million for overtime or extra work (which is the most common 
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type of envelope wage work in Western and Northern EU Member States), and 4 
million for both their regular and overtime work (Williams 2009b, 2013b; Williams 
and Padmore 2013a,b).
h e composition of the undeclared economy, however, markedly varies across the 
EU-27. In East-Central Europe and Southern Europe, undeclared work is composed 
more of envelope wages (61 per cent and 70 per cent respectively of all undeclared 
work) whilst in Nordic nations and Western Europe, such work is largely wholly 
undeclared work (60 per cent and 83 per cent of all undeclared work). Examining 
wholly undeclared work, undeclared waged employment is a higher proportion of 
all undeclared work in East-Central Europe and Southern Europe whilst undeclared 
self-employment is a greater proportion of undeclared work in Western Europe and 
the Nordic nations. Paid favours for close social relations, furthermore, are far more 
prominent in Western Europe and Nordic nations than in East-Central and Southern 
Europe (European Commission 2007a; Williams and Renooy 2013).
Although each type of undeclared work exists in all populations, the precise 
coni guration of the undeclared economy varies geographically across the European 
Union. h ese variations are important when seeking policy measures to tackle 
undeclared work in dif erent European regions. Some policy approaches and measures 
may be more important in some European regions than others.
3. POLICY APPROACHES TOWARDS UNDECLARED 
WORK
Public policy towards the undeclared economy has been traditionally dominated 
by a deterrence approach that seeks to eradicate it. Viewing undeclared workers as 
‘rational economic actors’ who engage in undeclared work when the benei ts are 
greater than the expected cost of being caught and punished (Allingham and Sandmo 
1972), the goal has been to change the cost/benei t ratio confronting those engaged or 
thinking about engaging in this realm (e.g., Grabiner 2000; Hasseldine and Li 1999; 
Richardson and Sawyer 2001). h is is achieved by increasing the actual and perceived 
risks and costs associated with participation in undeclared work by i rstly, improving 
the perceived or actual likelihood of detection and secondly, increasing the penalties 
and sanctions for those caught.
Over the past decade or so, however, the validity of this public policy approach 
has been questioned for three reasons. Firstly, there is the issue of its ef ectiveness. 
Although some i nd that increasing the probability of detection reduces participation 
in undeclared work at least for some income groups (Slemerod et al. 2001), others i nd 
that it leads to a growth in undeclared work (Varma and Doob 1998; Bergman and 
Nevarez 2006). Similarly, although some i nd that increasing penalties reduces such 
work (Klepper and Nagin 1989; De Juan et al. 1994), others identify that increasing 
penalties leads to a growth in such work (Varma and Doob 1998; Murphy 2005). As 
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Murphy (2005) asserts, the use of threat and legal authority can produce the opposite 
behaviour from that sought. Indeed, some even conclude that ‘it is not sensible to 
penalize illicit work with intensii ed controls and higher i nes’ (Schneider and Enste 
2002: 192).
Secondly, the recognition that a large proportion of undeclared work is 
undertaken on an own-account basis raises further questions about the validity of 
simply eradicating such activity. It is now widely recognized that undeclared self-
employment is ot en a seedbed for entrepreneurship and enterprise development 
(Evans et al. 2006; ILO 2002a,b; SBC 2004; Williams and Martinez 2014). If national 
governments therefore seek to eradicate such work, they will stamp out through their 
policies towards undeclared work precisely the enterprise and entrepreneurship that 
their enterprise culture policies are seeking to nurture. Stamping out undeclared work 
also has implications for active citizenship, by which is here meant the provision of 
services to others living outside one’s household in order to help them out. Given that 
over half of all undeclared work is embedded in relations of familial and community 
solidarity, eradicating such activity results in governments preventing engagement in 
precisely the type of endeavour that its policies on promoting active citizenship are 
seeking to foster.
h ird and i nally, eliminating it fails to contribute to tackling the long-standing 
problem of increasing employment participation rates, which has recently got worse 
due to the global economic recession. In 2007, some 65.4 per cent of the EU working 
population were in jobs and by 2011 this had fallen to 64.3 per cent (European 
Commission 2014). Over one in three working-age people in Europe were therefore 
jobless. To achieve full participation, one new job for every two currently in existence 
is thus needed (a 50 per cent increase in the number of jobs).
For these reasons, calls have been made for governments to transform undeclared 
work into declared work rather than simply eradicate it (European Commission 
2003a,b,c, 2007a; Small Business Council 2004; Williams and Renooy 2013). Indeed, at 
the 2003 Lisbon Summit of the European Council, Employment Policy Guideline no. 
9 was published on ‘transforming undeclared work into regular work’, which states:
Member States should develop and implement broad actions and measures … which 
combine simplii cation of the business environment, removing disincentives and providing 
appropriate incentives in the tax and benei ts system, improved law enforcement and the 
application of sanctions (European Commission 2003b: 9).
Further calls to move in this direction were provided by the European Commission 
(2007a) in its second communication on undeclared work that explicitly called for 
Member States to transform undeclared work into declared work. Increasingly, 
therefore, the demand has been for deterrence measures to be complemented by a 
range of new policy measures that help transform undeclared work into declared 
work.
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Table 1 provides a typology of the various policy approaches and measures 
available for shit ing undeclared work into the declared economy, distinguishing 
between a ‘hard’ compliance approach based on the rational economic actor model 
which uses either deterrence measures and/or measures that make declared work 
benei cial and easier, and a ‘sot ’ approach that engenders a culture of commitment 
to acting lawfully. As can be seen, the hard compliance approach can be pursued by 
simply seeking to increase the costs of operating undeclared so as to elicit behaviour 
change, which is a ‘negative reinforcement’ approach that detects and punishes those 
engaged in non-compliant or ‘bad’ behaviour. However, this is not the only way of 
eliciting changes in behaviour.
Table 1. A typology of policy approaches for shit ing undeclared work into the declared 
economy
Approach Method Measures (examples) 
‘Hard’: compliance 
through deterrence
Improved detection Data matching and sharing
Joined up strategy
Joint operations
Increased penalties Increased penalties for evasion 
Increase perception 
of risk
Advertising the penalties for informal working
Advertising the ef ectiveness of detection procedures.
‘Hard’: compliance 
through incentives 
to be declared
Prevention Simplii cation of compliance
Direct and indirect tax incentives
Smooth transition to self-employment
Introducing new categories of work
Micro-enterprise development
Curative Demand-side incentives (e.g. service vouchers; targeted 
direct taxes; targeted indirect taxes)
Supply-side incentives (e.g. society-wide amnesties; 
voluntary disclosure; formalisation services)
‘Sot ’: engendering 
commitment
Fostering culture of 
commitment 
Awareness raising
Promoting benei ts of declared work
Changing perception of tax fairness
On the one hand, the hard compliance approach can also focus on making it easier 
and more benei cial to operate in the declared economy (OECD 2012; Williams and 
Renooy 2013). h is represents a ‘positive reinforcement’ approach that rewards ‘good’ 
behaviour rather than punishing ‘bad’ behaviour; it uses ‘carrots’ rather than ‘sticks’ 
to elicit behaviour change. Such policy measures can be either preventative measures 
that stop non-compliance in the i rst place, or remedial/curative measures that 
encourage people to shit  their undeclared work into the declared economy.
h is ‘hard’ compliance approach, grounded in a view of participants in the 
undeclared economy as ‘rational economic actors’, assumes that tackling undeclared 
work is simply a case of changing the cost/benei t ratio confronting them. h e 
problem, however, is that this fails to explain why so many businesses and workers 
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are compliant even in the absence of an appropriate cost/benei t ratio confronting 
them (Wood and Bischof  2013). In other words, it ignores the role morality has to 
play in human behaviour. Recognising this, a ‘sot ’ approach has emerged. Rather 
than alter either the costs of undeclared work and/or benei ts of declared work so as to 
encourage compliance, the intention of the ‘sot ’ tax morality approach is to engender 
commitment to working declared so that ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’ are not needed. Put 
another way, there is a shit  from the use of direct controls to engender compliance 
to indirect controls to foster the commitment of citizens to acting in a lawful manner 
by improving the psychological contract between the state and its citizens. h is is 
achieved by educating people about the benei ts of declared work and not evading tax, 
social security and labour laws, such as through awareness campaigns as well as by 
promoting procedural justice and fairness amongst tax and social security oi  ces and 
labour inspectorates (Braithwaite 2007; Braithwaite and Reinhart 2000; Torgler 2007; 
Williams and Renooy 2013).
h ese policy approaches, of course, are not mutually exclusive. A government 
for example, might use incentives to shit  undeclared work into the declared realm 
(e.g., simplifying regulatory compliance) at the same time as using sot  measures (e.g., 
awareness raising campaigns), and, for those failing to comply, implement tougher 
sanctions for those caught. As such, a continuum of possible policy approaches can be 
envisaged with a wholly deterrence approach at one end and a wholly sot  approach 
at the other. Until now, few studies have sought to evaluate where governments sit on 
this spectrum and more particularly, the extent to which governments have shit ed 
away from a largely deterrence approach.
One of the few notable exceptions is a study by Williams (2008), which examines 
the 2001 and 2003 National Action Plans for Employment (NAPs) and the National 
Reform Programmes 2005–2008 (NRPs) of each Member State, along with two 
international reviews of the initiatives being pursued in dif erent countries (European 
Employment Observatory 2004; European Industrial Relations Observatory 2005). In 
2001, before the European Commission called for undeclared work to be transformed 
into declared employment, this i nds that deterrence measures dominated. Following 
the publication of Employment Guideline No. 9 in 2003, however, although deterrence 
measures remained widely used, a number of mostly west European and Nordic 
countries began to develop incentives to operate in the declared realm, mostly in the 
form of preventative measures although a few adopted curative measures. By 2005, 
this tendency had spread, albeit again mostly in the form of preventative rather than 
curative measures. Largely absent, however, was the use of a sot  approach.
However, this evaluation had two shortcomings. Firstly, documents such as 
the NAPs are written to show how each Member State has positively responded to 
European Commission requests. Secondly, simply documenting whether a measure 
exists in a country means that small-scale and piecemeal pilot experiments are 
accorded the same importance as large-scale mainstream initiatives and there is 
no way of evaluating the relative importance accorded to dif erent types of policy. 
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h e consequence may well be that the degree of the shit  away from the deterrence 
approach will be exaggerated. Here, therefore, the aim is to seek a more nuanced and 
up-to-date evaluation of the degree to which European national governments have 
shit ed away from an eradication approach and pursued innovative measures to shit  
undeclared work into the declared economy.
4. EVALUATING PUBLIC POLICY APPROACHES TOWARDS 
UNDECLARED WORK IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
To evaluate the degree to which this European Commission call to move beyond 
an eradication approach and towards an approach which seeks to shit  undeclared 
work into the declared realm has been adopted by European national governments, 
a web-based survey was conducted during 2010 of senior oi  cials responsible for 
tackling undeclared work in European countries in labour inspectorates, revenue 
administrations, social security administrations, trade unions, employer organisations 
and other relevant agencies (e.g. customs, border police, immigration). Of the 499 
invitations to participate, 104 responses were received (a 21 percent response rate). 
In all 31 countries (27 EU Member States, along with Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway 
and Switzerland), at least one high-ranking representative of the authority who takes 
the lead on tackling undeclared work was surveyed. h e issues covered by this survey 
included: the characteristics of the current national institutional framework in each 
country; the existing policy measures used; their perceptions of the importance of each 
policy measure in the overall approach adopted; their perceptions of its ef ectiveness 
at tackling undeclared work; and perceived best practices in this i eld. Secondly, 
and following this web survey, 24 in-depth semi-structured interviews were held 
with a selection of these stakeholders. h e intention was i rstly to provide additional 
information to i ll in any gaps on existing national institutional frameworks and policy 
measures adopted in dif erent countries following the web survey, and secondly, to 
seek richer in-depth understanding of the various approaches being adopted and the 
perceived ef ectiveness and importance of them (for details, see Dekker et al. 2010).
To evaluate the degree to which this European Commission call to move beyond 
an eradication approach and towards an approach which seeks to shit  undeclared 
work into the declared realm has been adopted by European national governments, 
Table 2 reports the i ndings regarding the range of policy measures used by these 31 
countries in 2010, as well as the perceived ef ectiveness of each policy measure by 
stakeholders in the countries where each measure had been implemented. h is reveals 
that in 2010, although every country continued to use deterrence policy measures 
(‘sticks’) to tackle the undeclared economy, a large proportion of countries also used 
incentives (‘carrots’) to encourage participation in the declared economy. h ese 
incentives, however, largely comprised preventative measures (used in 90 per cent of 
countries), with curative measures used in only 64 per cent of countries. Moreover, 
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the sot  commitment approach had begun to take hold with 69 per cent of countries 
now using measures associated with this approach.
Table 2. Prevalence and perceived ef ectiveness of policy measures in 31 European countries 
% of 
nations
% stakeholders stating measure is:
Policy Ef ective Neutral Inef ective
Hard compliance: deterrence measures 
Penalties: 93 50 45 5
Administrative sanctions for purchasers/
companies
87 46 49 6
Administrative sanctions for suppliers/employees 83 41 59 0
Penal sanctions for purchasers/companies 74 59 33 8
Penal sanctions for suppliers/employees 52 53 42 5
Measures to improve detection: 100 64 34 2
Workplace inspections 100 75 17 8
Data matching and sharing 83 72 25 2
Registration of workers prior to starting work or 
on i rst day of work
74 74 23 3
Coordination of data sharing across government 65 82 19 0
Mandatory ID in the workplace 65 70 30 0
Certii cation of business, certifying payments of 
social contribution and taxes
65 62 33 5
Coordination of operations across government 61 64 36 0
Coordinating strategy across government 57 56 44 0
Use of peer-to-peer surveillance (e.g. telephone 
hotlines)
39 20 80 0
Hard Compliance: incentive measures
Preventative incentive measures:
90 45 43 12
Simplify compliance procedures 87 62 38 0
Ease transition from unemployment into self-
employment
65 29 63 8
Direct tax incentives (e.g., exemptions, deductions) 61 57 33 10
Training & support to business start-ups 61 50 46 4
Advice on how to formalise 61 33 67 0
Connecting pension schemes to formal labour 61 47 41 12
Micro-i nance to business start-ups 52 48 52 0
Reduce regulations 48 56 38 6
Changing minimum wage upwards 48 24 59 18
Ease transition from employment into self-
employment 
44 15 77 8
Restricting free movement of (foreign) workers 43 29 53 18
Technological innovations (e.g. certii ed cash 
registers) 
43 73 27 0
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% of 
nations
% stakeholders stating measure is:
Policy Ef ective Neutral Inef ective
New categories of work (e.g., for small or mini-
jobs)
35 59 33 8
Social security incentives 35 62 15 23
Introducing supply chain responsibility 17 78 0 22
Changing minimum wage downwards 9 0 50 50
Curative incentive measures: 64 61 35 4
Stimulate purchasers to buy declared:
Targeted direct tax incentives 61 65 29 6
Service vouchers 26 58 42 0
Targeted indirect taxes 17 63 25 13
Stimulate suppliers to formalise:
Formalisation advice to business 30 44 56 0
Formalisation support services to businesses 30 57 29 14
Free advice/training on record-keeping 22 57 43 0
Fact sheets on record-keeping 22 57 43 0
Targeted VAT reductions 17 43 43 14
Individual-level amnesties for voluntary disclosure 17 75 25 0
Free record-keeping sot ware to businesses 13 50 50 0
Gradual formalisation schemes 13 67 33 0
Society-wide amnesties 9 10 0 0
Sot  approach: commitment to declared work 
measures:
69 44 52 4
Measures to improve tax/social security/labour law 
knowledge
65 50 50 0
Campaigns to inform undeclared workers of risks 
and costs of working undeclared
61 64 36 0
Campaigns to inform users of undeclared work of 
the risks and costs
61 50 40 10
Campaigns to inform undeclared workers of 
benei ts of formalising their work
57 43 47 10
Campaigns to inform users of undeclared work of 
the benei ts of declared work
52 35 59 6
Use of normative appeals to people to declare their 
activities 
52 33 67 0
Campaigns to encourage a culture of commitment 
to declaration
39 29 64 7
Adoption of commitment rather than compliance 
approach (e.g., ‘responsive regulation’) 
30 50 40 10
Measures to change perceived fairness of the 
system
26 25 75 0
Measures to improve procedural justice of the 
system (i.e., degree to which people believe 
government has treated them in a respectful, 
impartial and responsible manner)
17 60 40 0
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Examining the measures to shit  undeclared work into the declared realm, the 
i nding is that although such policy measures have been employed, as called for by 
the European Commission, the range of measures adopted has been relatively narrow. 
Starting with incentives to prevent entry into the undeclared realm, the i nding is that 
90 percent of countries adopted one or more preventative policy measure. However, 
beyond the simplii cation of compliance, only a limited number of countries have 
adopted other preventative policy measures. It is similarly the case that curative 
or remedial measures which seek to shit  undeclared work into the declared realm 
have not been widely adopted. Just 64 percent of countries use one or more curative 
measure to tackle undeclared work, and again, the range of curative measures used 
is narrow. Beyond targeted direct tax incentives (e.g., income tax relief/reduction/
subsidy schemes), less than one-third of countries have adopted any other curative 
policy measure. Finally, 69 per cent of the countries have adopted sot  commitment 
measures and in the countries in which they have been adopted, these have so far 
mostly involved campaigns targeting various groups involved in undeclared work. 
Few countries have pursued policy measures to improve either procedural justice or 
the perceived fairness of the system.
h ese data on the proportion of countries that have adopted dif erent policy 
measures, however, fails to assess which is the dominant approach. To resolve this 
shortcoming, this 2010 survey asked stakeholders to rank four dif erent approaches 
from the one accorded the most importance to the least importance in their country 
when tackling undeclared work. As Table 3 displays, 57 per cent stated that the 
hard compliance approach based on increasing the costs of non-compliance (i.e., 
the deterrence approach) was the most important in their country, with 33 per cent 
citing the hard compliance approach based on the use of incentives to improve the 
ease and benei ts of engaging in declared work (19 per cent citing the preventative 
approach and 14 per cent the curative approach), and 10 per cent citing the sot  
approach as the most important. Analysing the policy approach accorded the least 
importance, meanwhile, 84 per cent cited those that seek to transform undeclared 
work into declared employment; only 16 percent cited the deterrence approach. h e 
clear message, therefore, is that the vast bulk of countries remain entrenched in a 
deterrence approach and transforming undeclared work into declared employment is 
neither widely accepted nor adopted.
Table 3. Social partner opinion of the relative importance accorded to dif erent types of 
policy approach in their country, 2010
% citing: Most important 2nd Important Least important
Hard compliance: deterrence 57 17 16
Hard compliance: preventative incentives 19 46 23
Hard compliance: curative incentives 14 19 32
Sot  commitment approach 10 18 29
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Turning to the ef ectiveness of dif erent approaches, Table 2 above provides a 
considerable amount of detailed information on the perceived ef ectiveness of 
dif erent policy measures in tackling undeclared work. Rather than here review these 
i ndings regarding each and every policy measure in detail, the perceived ef ectiveness 
of the dif erent policy approaches is evaluated by examining the answers stakeholders 
gave when asked to rank what type of policy approach they view as most ef ective, 
second most ef ective and least ef ective at tackling undeclared work. Table 4 reports 
the results. It reveals that the majority (55 per cent) of stakeholders see the deterrence 
(‘sticks’) side of the hard compliance approach as the most ef ective means of tackling 
undeclared work, whilst 35 per cent view the incentives side of the hard compliance 
approach as most ef ective (20 per cent viewing preventative measures and 15 per cent 
curative measures as most ef ective), and just 10 per cent view the sot  commitment 
approach as the most ef ective approach. Overall, therefore, there persists throughout 
Europe a view that increasing the costs of undeclared work by raising the penalties 
and improving detection rates is the most ef ective means of tackling undeclared 
work. Stakeholders across Europe remain entrenched in a view that deterrence is 
more ef ective.
Table 4. Type of policy measures stakeholders view as most and least ef ective in Europe 
% citing: Most ef ective 2nd most ef ective Least ef ective
Hard compliance: deterrence 55 13 12
Hard compliance: preventative incentives 20 41 13
Hard compliance: curative incentives 15 27 31
Sot  commitment approach 10 19 44
In sum, despite a wider array of policy measures now being used to tackle the 
undeclared economy, the overarching i nding of this 2010 survey is not only that the 
deterrence approach is ranked the most important policy approach in the majority of 
European countries but also that it is seen as the most ef ective approach for tackling 
the undeclared economy.
5. CONCLUSIONS
h e aim of this paper has been to evaluate the extent to which the conventional 
eradication approach towards undeclared work has been transcended and replaced 
by an approach that seeks to transform undeclared work into the declared economy. 
Reporting the results of a 2010 survey of 104 senior stakeholders from government 
departments, trade unions and employer organisations in 31 European countries, and 
24 follow-up in-depth interviews, the i nding has been that although there is a move 
towards adopting policy measures to shit  undeclared work into the declared economy, 
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a deterrence approach that seeks to eliminate undeclared work remains the principal 
approach in the majority of European countries and also the approach viewed as the 
most ef ective way of tackling undeclared work in most countries. Despite the calls by 
the European Commission to shit  away from an eradication approach and towards 
shit ing undeclared work into the declared economy, therefore, this approach has not 
been widely accepted or adopted.
h is has important implications. Unless this approach of shit ing undeclared work 
into the declared realm becomes more widely accepted and adopted, then European 
governments will continue not only to hinder employment creation and social inclusion, 
but will also unintentionally prevent precisely the entrepreneurship and active citizenship 
that they are so desperately seeking to nurture through their enterprise culture and 
active citizenship policies through their deterrence approach towards undeclared work. 
h ese contradictions can only be resolved by putting greater emphasis on seeking to 
legitimise undeclared work using incentives to make working on a declared basis easier 
and more benei cial and/or by pursuing sot  commitment policy measures.
Having here identii ed for the i rst time the gap between the European Commission’s 
desire to transfer undeclared work into the declared realm and the dominant approach 
of European national governments, which deters such work rather than transforms it 
into declared work, action to bridge this gap is needed. Here, therefore, a research 
agenda is set out to do so.
h e i rst issue that needs to be addressed is that policy measures need to be evaluated 
to a far greater extent than is currently the case. Although some policy initiatives have 
been evaluated in considerable depth, such as service vouchers (Gerard et al. 2012; 
Peeters et al. 2008), the vast majority of policy measures have not. h e consequence 
is that there is little understanding of the ef ectiveness of dif erent policy measures 
and certainly no comparative studies that judge the relative ef ectiveness of dif erent 
measures. h ese evaluations are badly required. h e problem confronting evaluation 
studies, however, is whether policy measures should be evaluated solely in terms of 
the objectives they set themselves, or whether they should be evaluated in terms of 
other objectives such as their ability to shit  work into the declared economy. If the 
latter is the case, a common unit of evaluation will be required to compare policy 
measures. Whether this should be a return/cost ratio, such as the cost of transferring 
an undeclared worker/job into the declared economy, is open to debate.
Future research does not simply need to evaluate the comparative ef ectiveness of 
individual policy measures at tackling undeclared work. It also needs to evaluate the 
most ef ective way of putting these policy measures together in various combinations 
and sequences. At er all, the array of contrasting policy approaches and measures are 
not mutually exclusive. A key policy issue, therefore, is deciding which combinations 
of policy measures are most ef ective. At present, for example, measures to improve 
detection through inspections are ot en combined with campaigns seeking to raise 
awareness or warn customers that inspections are about to occur. h ere are also 
various ways of temporally sequencing policy measures, some of which might be more 
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ef ective than others. Amnesty and voluntary disclosure schemes, for instance, are 
frequently followed by tougher sanctions. h e Australian government in its ‘responsive 
regulation’ approach, for example, uses sot  commitment measures in the i rst instance 
to facilitate compliance, followed by persuasion and only then punitive measures to 
tackle non-compliance (Braithwaite 2007; Job et al.  2007). However, whether this 
temporal sequencing is more ef ective than other sequences has not been evaluated. 
h us, in the future, evaluations will need to be conducted of which combinations 
of measures ordered in what sequence are most ef ective. Indeed, evaluating which 
combinations and sequences of measures are ef ective, therefore, is just as important 
as evaluating the ef ectiveness of individual policy measures.
Once this is known, then the transferability of individual policy measures, as well 
as various combinations and sequences from one context to another, can be evaluated. 
At present, however, few evaluations even exist of the ef ectiveness of individual 
policy measures, not to mention their ef ectiveness when used in conjunction with 
other measures. Only when such evaluations have been conducted, however, will it be 
possible to consider whether these policy measures could be transferable across sectors 
and countries, as well as which combinations and sequences of policy measures could 
be used in dif erent contexts. At er all, tackling an undeclared economy dominated by 
a system of envelope wage payments will require a dif erent approach than trying to 
reduce an undeclared economy dominated by small-scale paid favours between close 
social relations for redistributive rationales in the domestic services realm. In future, in 
consequence, evaluations will need to be conducted of which measures ordered in what 
sequence are most ef ective in which contexts and in conjunction with other measures.
In sum, this paper has highlighted the intransigence of European national 
governments in shit ing from a deterrence approach based on a desire to eliminate 
undeclared work to a public policy approach that seeks to shit  undeclared work into 
the declared economy. It is to be hoped, therefore, that this i nding will now elicit 
greater discussion of how to encourage such a policy approach amongst national 
governments, and greater debate across European countries about the unintended 
consequences for economic inclusion, entrepreneurship and active citizenship of 
continuing to pursue their deterrence approach. If it does so, then this paper will have 
achieved its objective.
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